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1 Introduction
External donors have invested a great deal in the
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in
efforts to make it a viable multilateral instrument.
Significant questions remain, however: is APSA
meant to create and refine additional levels of
governance? If so, how will the different levels
effectively connect with one another? What would
it take for its core element, the African Standby
Force (ASF), to become an effective element of
multilayered security governance in Africa? What
would the roles of the various stakeholders be,
including the UN, the African Union (AU),
Regional Economic Communities (RECs),
member states and international partners? 
2 The ASF: a regional security strategy tool
The ASF was envisioned by African Chiefs of
Defence as early as the late 1990s, but only found
its true political impetus in the African Union’s
Constitutive Act (2000). Articles 4h and 4j of the
Act gave the new Union the right to intervene in
a member state in grave circumstances, namely
war crimes, genocide and crimes against
humanity (African Union 2000).
The first step in operationalising the ASF after
the creation of the AU was the adoption of the
‘Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the
Peace and Security Council of the African Union’
(PSC Protocol), in July 2002. With that Protocol,
Africa endowed itself with ‘a standing decision-
making organ for the prevention, management and
resolution of conflicts’ (Article 2.1, African Union
2002: 4). The PSC, a council of 15 periodically
elected member states is one core aspect of the
APSA. It is meant to be supported by the AU
Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental
Early Warning System, a Special Fund, and the
ASF (Article 2.2, African Union 2002: 5).
The ASF is meant to be composed of five Regional
Standby Force brigades from African RECs: the
Southern African Development Community
(SADC), the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic
Community of Central African States (ECCAS),
as well as two ‘so-called’ Regional Mechanisms
(RMs) for East and North Africa respectively. It
was supposed to be operational by 2010. This was
not achieved for several reasons, most of which
were related to a lack of capacity within the AU
and the RECs (African Union 2005, 2003).
The ASF was initially conceptualised as a quick
reaction force that would enable Africans to
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respond swiftly to a crisis unhampered by the
heavy political and institutional burdens typical
of the UN (the UN would, however, take over
after an agreed period, and assume the tasks of
stabilisation and peace consolidation). The
concept was later refined and broken down into
six scenarios: (1) observation and monitoring
missions; (2) preventive deployments in the case
of rising political tensions; (3) humanitarian
assistance missions; (4) traditional peacekeeping
operations; (5) peace support in a non-permissive
environment; and (6) forceful intervention in a
member state in grave circumstances.
While it constitutes a far-reaching achievement
on paper, inconsistent interpretations of what
the ASF should be has made its implementation
difficult.
3 The ASF: a moving target
Early on, it was proposed that ASF brigades
would be multidimensional, and would include
military, police and civilian components. In
practice, however, the first ASF Implementation
Roadmap, which spelled out the ASF’s stages of
development up to 2010, reflected a strong
military slant (African Union 2005). This is
unsurprising given that it was worked out mainly
by the military establishments of the member
states and supported mainly by international
partners’ military establishments.
The civilian component of the ASF suffers from
the resulting lack of attention, particularly with
regard to training. This may be because the
civilian component, with its security sector reform
(SSR) experts, election support, administrative
training, justice sector reform, support for
parliamentary work, and so on, has the potential
to play a political role and ultimately might
challenge African leaders’ foundations of power
(i.e. challenge the status quo).
While the AU has gained field experience in the
field of peacekeeping (such as the African Union
Mission in Sudan (AMIS), its first field mission),
the ASF has yet to be fully operationalised. With
ever-more diversified partners gaining interest,
and as recent UN experiences (such as with the
UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) or now the
UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC
(MONUSCO)) demonstrate the increasing
relevance of multidimensional operations, the
need to rebalance the original concept has
become increasingly obvious. To this end, a
second Roadmap, adopted in July 2008,
mandated accelerated work on the civilian and
police dimensions of the ASF (it was already
clear by then that the full operationalisation of
the ASF by 2010, as foreseen in Roadmap I, could
not be achieved). 
Roadmap II (African Union 2008) further
identified considerable tasks to be accomplished
over the next two years, including work on
headquarter capacity both within the AU and in
the regions; decision-making and mandate
issues; logistics depots; strategic lift; the rapid
deployment capacity (RDC); and a variety of
specific but nonetheless important domains such
as medical and legal issues (African Union 2008).
In October 2010 a major mapping exercise,
Amani Africa, was undertaken. Originally
planned to be the final certifying procedure of
the ASF and financed by European and
Canadian partners, the exercise concluded that
AU field operations such as AMIS and the
African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) had
demonstrated that African missions remain
heavily dependent on external support for the
entire range of their logistical needs, from
strategic deployment to field logistics, as well as
for their communications and information
systems needs. Further, a situation of quasi-total
financial dependence on external donors also
characterises African capacity-building efforts
(African Union 2010). 
A new plan, Roadmap III – which, to some extent,
encompasses the lessons learned from Amani
Africa – was endorsed by the African Chiefs of
Defence Staff in late October 2011 (African Union
2011). It recognises the lack of institutional
capacity and effective coordination between the
AU and RECs/RMs as one of the main blockages
to standardised planning and management
procedures for future ASF missions.1
This Roadmap includes ambitious additional
targets, such as achieving two independent,
multidimensional RDC units of 2,500 men/women
each on readiness at any given time by 2012, and
full operationality of the entire ASF by 2015
(African Union 2010). The RDC, which now tops
the list of priorities, combines quick reaction and
multidimensionality, blurring the picture further
and setting the target even higher.2
IDS Bulletin Volume 43  Number 4  July 2012 15
Currently, there is no mention of what will follow
such AU RDC units, which would only be
equipped for 30 days in the field. Clearly AU’s
hope is that once a quick response has been
launched, the UN can be politically bribed into
agreeing to send in UN forces with UN funding.
This may work with hybrid AU-UN operations,
which are difficult enough to establish. The case
of the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM), however, is a good example that this
calculation is flawed (Le Gouriellec 2012). 
Adding to the level of complexity, other new
tasks have appeared on the list of possible ASF
commitments in addition to the RDC, including
disaster relief and naval operations. It is clear
from recent conceptual work and ongoing
operations that the AU’s and RECs’ aims are
now pitched at the upper end of the scale of
scenarios developed in the original Roadmap. 
An escalating trend is visible in three 
directions:
z from a ‘fire brigade’ type of operation, carried
out by an agile, relatively unsophisticated ASF
(who subsequently hand over operations to
the UN), to a scenario where Africans
themselves assume peace consolidation tasks
in the long run;
z from mainly military-focused missions, to
multidimensional operations, additionally
endowed with the whole range of civilian and
police components; and
z from low-risk deployments in relatively peaceful
contexts, to operations in environments with a
high level of ‘spoilers’.
No open debate has been carried out on those
evolving assumptions, their political underpinnings
or feasibility requirements. Built on unaddressed
issues and high expectations, the ASF is therefore
a moving target, due to the inability of African
stakeholders to settle on a clear concept, setting
themselves ever more ambitious goals at every
stage.
3.1 Shared responsibility and regional ownership of
the process
Although there are a number of bilateral and
multinational contributors to the ASF, the
European Union (EU) has carried the lion’s
share of support for developing the ASF since
2007. Of course, the UN’s involvement, and G8
support need to be acknowledged but the EU,
particularly, demonstrates the main difficulties,
in terms of ownership, that need to be addressed.
The political instrument for helping Africans to
help themselves was set up as the African Peace
Facility (APF), which was drawn from the 9th
European Development Fund (EDF). Originally
budgeted at €300 million, most of the money was
quickly spent on Peace Support Operations in
the Comoros, Sudan, Somalia, and the Central
African Republic. The APF was then expanded to
€440 million. However, only one third of the €35
million that was reserved for capacity-building
measures and strengthening institutions had
been used by 2010 (interview, ECCAS technical
assistant, Libreville, December 2010). In fact,
the AU and the RECs are not able to absorb all
the money on offer from different – especially
bilaterally competing – donors, who are queuing
up to spend their Overseas Development
Assistance (ODA) in Africa (APF funding under
the 9th EDF did not count against their ODA).
The next African Peace Facility of the 10th EDF
is already decided upon with a budget of €600
million, of which €65 million is dedicated to
capacity-building (European Commission 2012).
One of the ‘flagships’ of EU support to capacity-
building was supposed to be Peacekeeping
Training Centres (PTCs) for the ASF. However,
this project has been repeatedly delayed by
misunderstandings between European and
African partners, and among different parts of
the EU bureaucracy, poor expertise, and
disregard for the partners’ views. For instance, in
the spring of 2009, a joint EU-AU delegation was
scheduled to undertake an initial assessment of
the PTC to finally decide which Training Centres
would get what funding. However, the AU
delegates never showed up. Officially the AU had
not been able to obtain visas for its delegates.
The reality, however, was that the EU had
pressed on the earliest possible date to
commence, although the AU had signalled that
they were not yet ready (separate interviews with
AU and EU officials, December 2010). 
It is extremely difficult to assess the effectiveness
of multilevel donor support, as there are no clear
benchmarks, or the hierarchy among those
benchmarks is debatable. Multiple strategic
partnership communication exists between
individual African and European states, and at
least, on the European side, at sub-state level.
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At times, it appears that Western states overdo
the variety of their contacts with the AU and
African regions at the expense of efficiency. For
instance, in Spain, autonomous regions develop
their own Africa policies, and in Germany four
different ministries have their own independent
Africa policy projects, which sometimes – but not
necessarily – dovetail with each other or with
policies decided on at EU level. The resulting
confusion between European and African
partners has rarely been subject to discussion.
Each side consists of quite differentiated political
bodies, both formal and informal, which are
interpreted by each actor involved according to
his politico-cultural awareness and preferences. 
The lack of clarity in assumptions largely explains
the discrepancies and lack of coherence in donor
support. As long as all assumptions remain
potentially valid, and none has clear authority over
the others, each donor remains free to ‘pick and
choose’ among the components of the ASF that best
match its national preferences or habits. For
instance, French and American interests are in the
tactical military fields, the French are much invested
in tactical and operational military formation, and
Germany, Canada, and Italy concentrate on police
training – each of them in countries, or with
organisations, of their immediate interest and choice.
It must be said that African partners, too, pick
and choose from what is on offer. As mentioned
earlier, whilst the initial APF €265 million funding
for operations, salaries, and equipment had to be
extended by an additional €140 million, the €35
million for capacity training was only reluctantly
called on. The USA’s and French bilateral support
to Africa are much more popular with recipients,
because they often mean material support to the
military. 
Generally, demand for improving the
professional capacities of staff and personnel
other than military is limited. In ECCAS two
thirds of the jobs that could advance regional
integration and administrative performance are
empty, although full funding for salaries is
provided. (Sub-)regional organisations often just
cannot absorb all the money on offer. 
3.2 Regionally integrated security policy: who does
what and who decides what?
It appears that the potential advantages of
mutually beneficial policymaking are still
hampered by difficulties of hierarchy between
the different prospective layers of governance.
That different layers of governance exist – or
that they can be established if not – is not in
doubt. But questions remain as to who has the
authority to decide what at which level, and who
should implement what.
The hierarchical order between the different
prospective layers is not evident: theoretically, in
the political sphere the UN Security Council
leads, followed by the AU, the RECs and RMs,
followed by the individual states, which would
have to implement the formers’ policy decisions.
The reality is the opposite, however: the power to
direct, execute and implement rests with the
individual states. For example, although the Peace
and Security Council of the AU was officially
designed as a decision-making body, states ignore
PSC decisions whenever it suits them. 
To take, for example, the case of AMISOM:
launched in 2007 it took four-and-a-half years
before more than two member states contributed
seriously to this operation, and then it was Kenya
rushing headlong into a campaign to protect its
international reputation as a stable state, and its
tourism industry. The fact that Kenyan troops are
now attached to AMISOM is largely a result of the
sobering costs of a longer than expected military
campaign. Generally, the AU commands little
respect from its member states; an organisation
that cannot even muster membership fees from
the majority of its member countries (a problem it
shares with the regional economic organisations) is
not a powerful player to be followed in contested
political cases. Whether member states will actually
honour the AU decision to provide the troops to
beef up AMISOM to up to 17,000 strength
remains to be seen. Currently, a core problem for
regional and sub-regional security integration is
the missing political joint vision of a common
strategic goal. Without the weight of member
states behind them, RECs, which are supposed to
implement AU decisions, will not do so. 
The sub-optimal development of political means
to deliver a policy according to the premises of
the AU constitution is primarily caused by
African states. To take one example of such
existing difficulties: Angola and the Democratic
Republic of Congo are members of both ECCAS
and SADC. Hence, both of them participate half-
heartedly in the development of two sub-regional
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ASF brigades. The recent announcement by
President Déby of Chad that he wishes to join
ECOWAS is another bewildering case in point,
particularly because the newly chosen Secretary
General of ECCAS is from Chad. Another
example: the United Nations Standing Advisory
Committee on Security Questions in Central
Africa (UNSAC), which has met twice yearly
since 1993, can be seen as being in direct
competition with ECCAS. It appears as if
countries do not want to decide between any of
these structures. One therefore wonders whether
countries’ policies are truly committed to
advancing regional integration via their sub-
regional organisation. Under such conditions,
projects logically lack ownership.
Regional integration can be translated into
multilevel governance: there is a dialectic
interaction between the two. Regional
integration can spread out into, and bring into
being, new levels of governance, be this in the
form of confidence-building measures between
states, or even as institutionalised security
alliances. APSA displays many indicators of such
an alliance. But for the time being, Africa
remains the least integrated region of the world
in many respects (although differentiations
between sub-regions apply). Presently African
states often remain preoccupied with their sheer
survival, barricaded behind national and customs
boundaries. The understanding that one’s own
existence can be ameliorated through the
indirect approach of bettering the common
neighbourhood has yet to become manifest. A
means to achieve better integration would
depend on the willingness to (1) pool, and
(2) delegate responsibility (or, in other words,
power). The implications of this are:
1 The lack of means of average contemporary
states demands a build-up and pooling of
capacities sufficient to address common
problems. APSA would appear the best means
to pool political power, and the ASF could
provide it with an instrument to share the
burden of keeping the peace. Unfortunately (so
far) nowhere does a reliable binding legal
document exist with AU or RECs member
states, between member states and RECs, or
the AU and member states, for the deployment
of pledged troops to the ASF. This means that
in fact there is no legal or other claim at any
level of the APSA structure to direct ASF forces.
2 Delegating responsibility can work in manifold
directions to simultaneously address firstly, the
overarching tasks beyond the level of nation
states – preferably in a multilateral fashion, and
secondly, more specialised, or geographically
limited tasks, at lower levels of governance.
If successfully implemented this accumulation of
capacities on a multilateral level may constitute
a shared political ownership of regional security. 
4 Conclusion
The ASF project has gone through many phases
of definition and redefinition since it was
conceived in the late 1990s. This article has
argued that the ASF is a ‘moving target’, due to
the inability of African stakeholders to settle on
a clear concept, setting themselves ever more
ambitious goals at every stage. 
Partners simultaneously suffer from, and
contribute to this state of affairs. Whilst
coordination efforts are undertaken, partners’
support too often still responds to national or
institutional interests, and each partner uses the
leeway created by the conceptual ambiguities of
the ASF to press its own priorities.
Also, the overwhelming role of non-African
partners in the conceptual maturation of the
ASF, and the impact of their funding decisions,
exacerbate the confusion about the true
direction of its development. The ASF is
burdened by the lack of political, conceptual, and
financial ownership. The result is at best an
ambiguous partnership between all stakeholders
and external partners involved, and at worst a
waste of human resources, financial means and
political capital. 
Only if AU member states make a conscious
effort to increase their political, conceptual and
especially, financial, stake in the ASF will they be
able to credibly demonstrate that it is not an
entirely European-mastered project. 
This may in turn provide a real step towards
common African policymaking. Multilevel
governance depends on the ability and
willingness to share a common vision and to pool
and delegate power towards its implementation.
Whilst the ability can be enhanced through
external support, the willingness requires
proactive ownership by member states.
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The AU Commission, representing a prospective
level of multilevel governance, should work with
the RECs to improve and ensure connectivity at
all levels, including transfer of information from
all RECs to the AU. For example, there has been
a sitting ECCAS liaison representative at the AU
since late 2007. Although his post is paid for by the
EU he has low visibility, and he still needs ECCAS
permission to travel between the seats of ECCAS
and the AU, which is not always granted (interview,
ECCAS official, March 2010). It is therefore
critical for the AU and RECs’ member states to
clarify the level and mandate of the liaison officers.
At the legal level the AU, RECs and RMs should
adopt binding legal documents with member states
for the deployment of pledged troops. This would
emphasise reliability through institutionalisation.
Also, this would clarify who can decide on the
deployment of the ASF.3 As a supplementary benefit,
this would mitigate cases of competition between,
for instance, ECOWAS and the AU, as seen in the
example of Côte d’Ivoire. ECOWAS does not appear
keen on any AU involvement in an issue they – in
their view – can sort out much better on their own.
Finally, decisions already made must be
implemented: this includes, for instance, the
offer Angola made in 2008 to send a 150-strong
formed-police-unit to the Mission de consolidation
de la paix en Centrafrique (the peace support
operation in the Central African Republic). 
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Notes
1 Roadmap III reads: ‘The lack of institutional
capacity and effective coordination between
the AU and RECs/RMs is one of the main
blockages to standardized planning and
management procedures for future ASF
missions’ (African Union 2010: 50).
2 As a comparison, a purely military EU battle
group, which comprises an extended battalion
of 1,500 men costs €100 million for six months
of permanent readiness.
3 Roadmap III addresses this topic as follows:
‘In the same vein, a comprehensive MOU on
the use of the ASF for AU mandated missions,
needs to be finalized and adopted. This MOU
should clarify the relationship between the
AU, RECs/RMs and Member States’ (African
Union 2010: 50).
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